Quebec's modern international outlook and its current paradiplomacy can be dated largely from the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. Since then, the provincial government in Quebec City and the Federal Government in Ottawa have had to tread a fine line in accommodating each other's constitutional rights in the field of international relations-a line that has occasionally been breached, especially in the years following the Quiet Revolution and in critical periods such as those prior to the 1980 and 1995 referenda. Foreign governments have also had to engage in careful diplomacy in order to avoid upsetting either Ottawa or Quebec City-and this has been especially true in the case of the countries historically most involved with Canada and Quebec-France, the US, and Britain. But whereas there has been some academic writing on Quebec's relationships with France and the US, very little attention has been devoted to Quebec-UK relations since the Quiet Revolution. This article seeks to fill that gap and argues that the Quebec-UK relationship since the 1960s can itself best be characterized as a "quiet revolution" in diplomacy that has largely avoided the controversies that have sometimes dogged Quebec's relations with France and the US.
French Canadian, attacked Duplessis as a reactionary who was stirring up Quebec nationalism to keep control of the province to the detriment of Quebec and the rest of Canada, a Commonwealth Relations Office official commented: "The French-Canadian, long since cut off from any ties with France, is by nature an isolationist imbued with the sense of a vital need to defend his language, religion and culture from being submerged in the powerful English-speaking world around him. Any suggestions of Federal grants to the provinces for, say, education, roads or other matters under provincial control, is viewed suspiciously as an attempt by the Federal Government to gain some control over the affairs of the provinces." Duplessis was characterized by this British official as "Canada's most controversial Provincial Premier and an aggressive guardian of Provincial autonomy." He was also seen as "militantly anti-communist," deriving his main support from Quebec's farming communities "to whom he extends many preferences." 1 The motive behind the Duplessis strategy was regarded in London as a desire for political autonomy for his province rather than concern for its economic well-being. But when provincial elections were held in July 1956, Duplessis and the Union Nationale were once again victorious, winning the vast majority of seats in the Quebec National Assembly.
There were widespread reports of vote-rigging and corruption after the election which seemed to confirm, as reported by the British High Commission in Ottawa, the "dark suspicion that politics in Quebec were dirtier than elsewhere in Canada." The general standards of election campaigns in the province were considered to be very low but "whatever is wrong with political morality in Quebec, it can hardly be denied that it is the Union Nationale Party which has profited most conspicuously from the present situation." 
Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution
The death of Duplessis in September 1959 and of his successor as premier, Paul Sauvé, in January 1960, was followed that June by elections that brought to power the Quebec Liberal party led by Jean Lesage. The Quebec Liberals had been out of office since August 1944 but were elected with 51 percent of the popular vote and 51 seats compared with 43 for the Union Nationale (Thompson, 1984) . As well as domestic reforms involving education, secularization and the ownership of natural resources, the new government set out to enhance Quebec's standing with the rest of Canada and the world. Quebec's international profile had already been raised by the visit of the president of France, Charles De Gaulle, in April 1960 (Thompson 1988; Meren 2013) Lesage's visit to London proved to be a relatively low-key affair, although he met some government officials at a lunch organized by the Canadian High Commission. This was in stark contrast to the attention lavished on him in Paris, where-as the Commonwealth Relations Office ruefully noted-he was greeted by President de Gaulle like a head of state, and even in Rome, where he was treated as an international celebrity. This diplomatic embarrassment caused British-and Canadian-officials to rethink their attitude toward visits by Quebec leaders, and when Lesage planned to return to London in October 1962 to open the Quebec legation in the UK, it was decided to make more of an effort to receive him. In fact, Lesage's visit had to be canceled because of the Quebec elections that were called for He also met various business leaders-an important part of his agenda as one of the main aims of his visit was "a mission to put Quebec on the map in an industrial way and end the Province's tendency for isolation." 5 The highlight of Lesage's visit was the official opening of Quebec Government House on May 7, accompanied by Agent General Hughes Lapointe, who had been appointed in January 1962. It was obviously an emotional occasion for the Quebec premier and he began his speech by saying a few words in French. He then explained to the assembled dignitaries what it meant for Quebec to have an international policy. The aim, he said, was for Quebec "to be present," to be part of the larger community both in Canada and beyond. By raising Quebec's international profile other countries would see for themselves what Quebec had to offer in terms of natural resources, business, tourism and culture. Pointing to the valuable work already being done by the Quebec agencies in Paris and New York, Lesage said that he was convinced that the new agency in London would be just as valuable. "We are confident," he said, "that it will render great service to our province, and serve to strengthen the ties of friendship between the British people and Canadians in general and Quebecers in particular." (The Times May 10, 1963) .
While he was in London, Lesage played down the recent formation of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) which became notorious in the 1960s for its regular bombings that killed several people and injured many others. Equally embarrassing for the international image of Quebec, especially in the UK, were the troubles that took place during the Queen's visit on October 10, 1964 , to commemorate the 100 th anniversary of the Quebec Conference on Canadian confederation, when violence between police and separatists became known as "Samedi de la Matraque"-"the Saturday of the Baton" (Le Devoir October 11, 1964;  Montreal Gazette October 11, 1964; The Times October 11, 1964 Above all, he concluded, "we must keep a very wary eye on future developments in Quebec.
We must continue to hope that all will be well, but I believe it is no longer inevitable that the province will remain part of Canada in the long run." It is in Britain's interest that Canadian stability and unity should be preserved both because of our considerable economic stake in the country and because Canada's contribution to the Western Alliance could be affected if she were faced with prolonged internal disorder or if Quebec were to break away." 8 At the meeting with Heath on April 14, 1971 , discussion centered mainly on economic matters and Bourassa explained that unemployment in Quebec, and a rise in the numbers looking for work because of an increased birth rate, made it imperative for Quebec to expand its industrial investment and that this needed to be done at a rate higher than the province's own resources would permit. This was the rationale for his present European tour.
Bourassa also said that the extreme separatist movement in Quebec was under control and that, with economic prosperity and a guarantee of cultural security, separatism would lose its appeal. In his view, it did not make sense for Quebec, with its current economic problems, to aim for separatism when throughout the world the movement was towards greater economic unity. promise not to amend the act, or transfer it to the Canadian government-patriation, as it was known-unless all the provinces, and especially Quebec, agreed (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990, 341 Montreal, produced a significant discussion paper about British policy in the event of Quebec independence.
"Clearly it is important for Britain that Canada, our Commonwealth and NATO partner, should remain strong and united," wrote Rich. "Conversely, it is not in our interest that the 'Quebec problem' should be a running sore which becomes worse rather than better and consequently weakens the Atlantic Community to a degree disproportionate to its intrinsic importance." After initial trouble of adjusting its economy if the economic union with the rest of Canada were dissolved, Rich believed that "an independent Quebec would be a viable state on the scale of the Scandinavian countries and play a responsible role in the international community. The real problem would be the future of the rest of Canada, most particularly Ontario and the Maritimes." However, despite his forebodings, Rich felt that separation would be avoided. "I base this on the instinctive caution and common sense of the French Canadian in the street which counter-balances nationalist enthusiasm, providing that his indignation is not over-provoked," he said. "But we cannot bank on this. Looking to the future we have to handle our affairs in Quebec in such a way that specific British interests are well promoted whichever way things turn out."
As Rich noted, Britain held quite a few cards if Quebec were to become independent.
Apart from the fact that the UK was Quebec's second-largest export market, British investment in Quebec, the desire for an exchange of experience and know-how in many different fields of life, and to diversify friendships and relationships was also significant, as This is not to say that the British government was unconcerned at the prospect of a separatist majority in the referendum which, it was feared, would have serious repercussions for both Quebec and the rest of Canada, especially economically and strategically. Indeed, the British view was that Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien, had been far too complacent in his attitude towards the referendum and on October 28, shortly before the referendum vote, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Sir Nicholas Bayne, met with Chrétien and read out a message from British Prime Minister John Major expressing concern at the prospect of a "yes" vote (Bayne 2014) .
British diplomacy during the referendum debate was very different, in public at least, from that of France and the United States. As regards the former, it was widely assumed that French President Jacques Chirac, was ready to give immediate official recognition to Quebec as a sovereign state if the "Yes" campaign emerged triumphant after the referendum vote (Bosher 1998; Bastien 1999; Herbert and Lapierre 2014) . US diplomacy, on the other hand, worked in the opposite direction as Washington made it clear that it much preferred that Canada should remain intact and indicated that an independent Quebec would not automatically be given the benefits accruing to Canada from the recently negotiated NAFTA agreement (Blanchard 1998; Stewart 2012) .
With the defeat of the referendum, which he blamed on "money and the ethnic vote,"
Parizeau resigned as premier and was succeeded in January 1996 by Lucien Bouchard, who had led the "Yes" campaign during the referendum and very nearly achieved victory.
Bouchard had been the Canadian ambassador in Paris (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) 
PQ interlude, September 2012-April 2014
The election in September 2012 of a minority PQ government in Quebec under Pauline
Marois did not signal any radical departure from the essential nature of the Quebec-UK relationship. While it is true that during her visit to the UK in January 2013 much more media attention was devoted to her trip to Edinburgh than to her time in London-speculation being that her meeting with the Scottish first minister and leader of the Scottish National Party, Alex Salmond, constituted a "separatist summit," appeared to be very wide of the mark. By contrast, the Quebec premier's focus during her visit to London was very much on economic diplomacy and the headline event was her attendance on January 28 at a lunch organized by the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce where she spoke on the subject of "Quebec-a thriving economy based on innovation and creativity," In a press release at the end of the visit she referred in neutral terms to her time in Scotland and the potential for 
Conclusions
The quiet revolution in Quebec-UK diplomacy since the 1960s has witnessed the gradual emergence of "a very amicable relationship based on mutual respect, political pragmatism and economic cooperation"-to quote a recent Quebec Agent-General (Boulanger 2013) .
Mutual respect can be seen in the frequent and trouble-free meetings made by British and France or the current economic and financial significance of Quebec's relationship with the US, the contemporary Quebec-UK relationship is nevertheless an important one and worthy of rather more attention from historians and political scientists than it has tended to be given.
